Last month, I temporarily put aside my austerity-induced feelings of workplace anxiety and put myself forward for a role on my workplace trade union, Birmingham UCU (a local branch of the University and College Union).
I’m pleased to say I’ve been accepted onto the Committee and, from September, will be serving as Communications Officer. I’d like to explain why I decided to get more active in my union in the hope of encouraging more people to join a union and to work together to make the workplace and our wider society a fairer and more pleasant place to live.
I’m proud to report that my local area is now officially a Tory-free zone™️. Last Thursday, Liz Clements and Fred Grindrod, Labour’s candidates for the new ward of Bournville & Cotteridge, were elected to serve as our local councillors. Even better, our existing Labour councillor, Mary Locke, was elected to the neighbouring single member ward of Stirchley.
It’s been a hectic couple of weeks since I last blogged, mostly due to a combination of returning to work and picking up a rotten cold (sadly, I think the two may be connected). Despite this, I’m pleased to say I’ve still managed to keep most of my campaigning commitments with Bournville Labour and even make time to take part in a planning session for Open Rights Group organisers at BOM on Saturday.
Just say no (to blanket retention of personal data)
Despite everything going on, I came away from the ORG campaign day with a renewed sense of purpose to keep on campaigning for digital rights in the year ahead. This boost probably explains why I’ve just spent some time this evening responding to a somewhat soul-destroying Home Office consultation on a code of practice governing the Investigatory Powers Act, the creepily dystopian surveillance and hacking law which shuffled onto the statute books in late 2016. I’ve posted below the contents of my email below at the bottom of this post, in case anyone is interested in the issues I’ve raised.
Essentially, the consultation is in response to last year’s judgement by the European Court of Justice, which stated that blanket retention of everyone’s personal data was illegal. The court judgement set out restrictions on retaining and accessing personal data, with the aim of making it a targeted system focused on serious crime, and requiring independent authorisation (usually a judge) before authorities can access personal data. Disappointingly but not surprisingly, the Home Office is choosing to interpret the judgement selectively, leaving in place the blanket data retention whilst (grudgingly) conceding the need for independent authorisation.
Stand up for yourself and show solidarity with at-risk groups
Given the well-documented history of surveillance powers being (mis)used against politicians, journalists, activists, whistleblowers and other groups, I encourage you to take part in the consultation and demand that the Home Office honours the court’s judgement and respects our human rights. You’ve got until 11.45pm tomorrow (18 January) to submit your response. click on the link below to speak up.
This is a response to the consultation on Communications Data code of practice under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, closing 18 January 2018.
As a UK citizen who believes in the rule of law, I am deeply concerned that you are using this public consultation in order to delay having to implement changes as a result of last year’s ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union declaring the Investigatory Powers Act’s indiscriminate retention of data illegal.
As well as being concerned about the delay caused by the public consultation, I am also very concerned that you are taking a ‘pick and choose’ approach to the Court of Justice’s ruling. For me, the most important element of the judgement was that it established that indiscriminate retention of personal data illegal. Despite this, you are still proposing to allow blanket retention of everyone’s personal data. By taking this approach I believe you are flying in the face of the court’s judgement and appear to have little or no regard for the rule of law and citizens’ fundamental rights. I urge you to comply with the court’s judgement and end blanket retention.
I am also alarmed that you do not plan to notify people that their personal data has been accessed, even after an investigation has concluded. Given the history of surveillance and anti-terrorism powers being inappropriately used against politicians, journalists, activists, whistleblowers and other groups, I believe introducing a credible notification system is important for rebuilding trust in the system and reducing the likelihood of future abuses. Furthermore, I believe the fact that we as citizens are unlikely to ever know if our personal data has been accessed creates a ‘chilling effect’, whereby just the understanding that authorities could access our personal data with little meaningful oversight discourages citizens from freely expressing themselves.
I read with dismay that you will also not be protecting our personal data by keeping it within the EU. I am particularly concerned that this means you will continue to allow my personal data, along with that of my fellow citizens in the UK, to be transferred to the United States, whose laws afford zero protection to non-citizens’ data. I urge you to reconsider your position and keep personal data within the EU.
Lastly, ask that you adopt a reasonable definition of serious crime so as to ensure authorities adopt a reasonable and proportionate approach to accessing personal data, and which takes proper account of the impact retaining and accessing such data has on our fundamental rights. With this in mind, I ask that you adopt the House of Lords’ definition of serious crime, namely crimes capable of sentences of at least one year, rather than your current, lower, definition of a six month sentence.
I hope that your honour the court judgement and implement it in full rather than the selective approach your current proposals would suggest.
I’m writing this post at my in-laws during some down time between Christmas and New Year. I’d love to say it’s been a relaxing break but unfortunately my father-in-law has been in hospital over Christmas, and this has added a fair amount of extra driving and worry on top of the usual holiday stresses.
With everything that’s been going on, I’ve had to take a break from my daily diet of political podcasts and stick to safer topics of conversation such as the weather, holiday plans and Christmas television. This enforced absence has made me realise what I miss most about my podcast habit, namely the opportunity it gives me to learn about and critically consider alternatives to politics as usual.
Rather than be depressed by this, I’m determined to channel my anger into something positive and help build a new politics that’s able to bring people together to demand a future that works for the many, not just the few.
Earlier this month, I spent an enjoyable and inspiring evening at Artefact cafe in Stirchley at the South Birmingham Co-operative Info Night No.1. The night was a chance to meet people who’d set up and/or are working in co-operatives in South Birmingham and learn more about the benefits they can offer workers and the wider community.
As an organiser for Open Rights Group Birmingham, I have followed with interest and not a little weariness the twists and turns as the government’s draft Investigatory Powers Bill makes its way through the pre-legislative scrutiny phase.
Today, the House of Commons science and technology committee published a highly critical report on the bill, with its chair, Nicola Blackwood MP commenting:
The current lack of clarity within the draft Investigatory Powers Bill is causing concern amongst businesses. There are widespread doubts over the definition, not to mention the definability, of a number of the terms used in the draft Bill. The Government must urgently review the legislation so that the obligations on the industry are clear and proportionate.
In particular, the report highlights the following problems:
The feasibility of collecting and storing Internet Connection Records ICRs – including the very real problem of keeping these highly personal records from (non state-sanctioned) hackers.
Anxiety amongst communication providers over the ability to use effective encryption, which Blackwood recognises is “important in providing the secure services on the internet we all rely on“. The committee particularly wants the government to provide greater clarity over the status of end-to-end encrypted communications, where decryption might not be possible by a communications provider that had not added the original encryption.
Concerns amongst certain communications over ‘equipment interference’. For some providers, such as Mozilla (the makers of Firefox), this concern appears to stem from a genuine concern for its users’ privacy and the integrity of the internet. For other providers, the concern is more about how a perception of hacking could hurt their competitiveness in a global market for services.
Uncertainty over costs. Coverage of the committee’s report has downplayed the risk associated with spiralling implementation costs, both for government and businesses. At last cost, the Home Secretary has put the cost of implementing the new ICR system at £247 million but the report notes that costs are likely to change (i.e. rise), given the uncertainty and rapid pace of technological change.
It’s worth noting that the committee’s remit was purely to look at the technical feasibility of the government’s proposals and how these might affect communications businesses, not whether the communications monitoring provisions or whether they are proportionate to the threats they are intended to deal with. These issues are expected to be addressed by the joint committe Joint Committee established to scrutinise the draft Bill as a whole.
I believe the criticisms levelled at the bill in this report are significant for a couple of reasons.
Firstly, by focusing solely on the technical feasibility of implementing the bill, it manages to side-step the highly polarised debate between privacy and security advocates. This report says, irrespective of your views on the merits of expanded monitoring of communications, you should be concerned as a citizen and taxpayer about the feasibility of implementing the government’s plans at anything approaching a sensible level of expenditure.
Secondly, by holding up the prospect that the Investigatory Powers Bill will do real harm to the growing UK tech sector, the report will hopefully encourage the government to modify its approach, if only to protect its supposed reputation for business confidence.
Both these signals – questions over the feasability of implementation and the likely damage to the UK’s growing tech sector – will not in itself be enough to stop the Investigatory Powers Bill becoming law, but it’s a start.
The Joint Committee is due to deliver its full report on the Investigatory Powers Bill no later than 17 February. It will be interesting to see whether this committee takes a similarly critical stance on the merits of expanded monitoring provisions and the limited amount of time the committee was given to scrutinise the bill.
As a member of the civil liberties organisation Liberty, it was with sadness that I read earlier this week week that Shami Chakrabarti is stepping down as director after 12 years in the role.
Shami Chakrabarti’s list of achievements – from overurning compulsory ID cards to challenging internnment of foreign terrorist suspects and, most recently, providing strong challenge over the government’s plans to scrap the Human Rights Act and greatly expand online surveillance – are all the more remarkable when you realise she joined Liberty the day before September 11 attacks in 2001. While I may still find myself despairing at the British political establishment’s respect for citizens and civil society, I can see that without Chakrabrarti’s principled leadership things could be a lot worse.
Chakrabarti has written a thoughtful piece for The Guardian to coincide with the announcment of her depature from Liberty. In it, she notes: “When fear stalks the land, blank cheques become all too easy and ever more dangerous.” This defintiely rings true of my recent experience campaigning against the Investigatory Powers Bill as part of the Open Rights Group. For me, the lowest point of the campaign (so far – it’s not over yet!) was when David Cameron sought to use the Paris Attacks to justify an attack on encryption, despite the fact that the terrorists had in fact coordinated the attacks using regular unencrypted text messages.
I was also struck by another of Chakrabarti’s observations: “We all love our own rights and those of friends, family and people like us. Other people’s freedoms seem cheaper until it’s almost too late.” Again, I have encountered this in my campaigning for the Open Rights Group. The common response of “nothing to hide, nothing to fear” when privacy concerns are raised in relation to the Investigatory Powers Bill reflects many people’s belief that they (and by extension, their friends and family) will never be adversely affected by expanded online and so we need not worry ourselves about the balance of power between citizen and state.
While I will be sad to see her go I can understand her reasons for stepping down, given the pressure and responsibility she must have felt over the past 12 years. I would like to thank Shami Chakrabarti for everything she has done to defend civil liberties and human rights.
On Wednesday, after months of speculation and a flurry of off-the-record ministerial briefings and some pretty cringeworthy attempts at PR by GCHQ, the UK Government finally published its surveillance bill, which has been given the more innocuous title of the Investigatory Powers Bill.
The Guardian has produced a clear summary of the main points here. You can also check out BBC News for a less opinionated assessment.
Here’s a round-up (pun intended) of reaction to the Investigatory Powers Bill and how campaigners can build a coalition to oppose the bill, but only if they take on the Government directly on the claims it makes on security and crime prevention.
An extended itemised phone bill or another step towards mass surveillance?
Not surprisingly, the Government’s assessment of the Investigatory Powers Bil was markedly different to that of privacy activists and human rights campaigners.
Liberty also performed strongly, promoting its 8 point Safe and Sound plan for targeted surveillance, which they say would keep us safe while respecting our privacy.
At Open Rights Group we punched above our weight, with Executive Director Jim Killock featured television and radio news programmes, including Radio 4’s World at One (jump to 15 min, 35 secs).
Where was Labour?
More surprisingly (and particularly disappointingly for me as a Labour member), there hasn’t been much evidence of the much talked-about ‘a new kind of politics’ from the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn. I cringed as I read Andy Burnham’s response to May’s proposals, wishing Labour had at least chosen to express caution and reserve judgement:
“From what the Home Secretary has said today, it is clear to me that she and the Government have listened carefully to the concerns that were expressed about the draft Bill that was presented in the last Parliament … It would help the future conduct of this important public debate if the House sent out the unified message today that this is neither a snooper’s charter, nor a plan for mass surveillance.”
After Burnham’s initial comments on the bill in the House of Commons, Labour has seemingly made no effort to communicate to the public its position on the Government’s plans for new surveillance powers. In echoes of Nineteen Eight-Four, there is no comment whatsoever on Labour’s Twitter account of the Investigatory Powers Bill. Given the serious nature of the comments by Amnesty and Liberty, it’s disappointing Labour doesn’t feel the need to engage on the issue, at least not in public view.
Presenting a detailed operational case for targeted, not mass surveillance
As a member and activist with the Open Rights Group, you’d expect me to be suspicious of the Government’s plans for surveillance and to be instinctively sympathetic to the arguments Amnesty and Liberty have made about the risks the Investigatory Powers Bill poses to our individual rights and civil society. But I am not so naive as to believe that a majority of the public share my outlook. I voted for Ed Miliband to become Labour leader, after all.
From talking to friends, family and strangers about the work of the Open Rights Group, I know how easily arguments about the need for security, mixed in with frightening examples of horrible criminal activities, more often than not crush appeals to protect privacy and other human rights. If campaigners such as myself are to convince others to oppose the Government’s plans, we need to go beyond principled appeals to protect human rights.
In particular, campaigners need to show that a ‘collect it all’ approach, which puts all of us under surveillance, is not just legally and morally unacceptable, it does not actually keep us any safer.
So far the only person I’ve seen take on this argument is Peter Ludlow, former Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University in the United States. Here’s a clip of him refuting the effectiveness of the NSA’s bulk data collection / mass surveillance approach. While Ludlow is talking about the United States, surely it is possible to do something similar here in the UK?
While David Anderson, in his review of the UK’s existing investigatory powers, accepted the case for continued bulk data collection, he did at least say the Government would need to set out a ” detailed operational case” before any new surveillance powers could be introduced.
Given the lack of strong political opposition to the Government’s plans, coupled with the public’s valid concerns over security, it would be foolish to think at least a plausible will not be presented. If campaigners here in the UK are to successfully oppose the bill, they must take a similar approach and try, as far as possible, to present a detailed case for the kind of system Liberty presents in its Safe and Sound plan.
Last Wednesday I arranged for Jim Killock, Executive Director of the Open Rights Group, to give a talk to Open Rights Group Birmingham about the threat mass surveillance poses to our human rights and democratic society.
I was spurred on to organise the talk because of the UK government’s plans to introduce new surveillance legislation this autumn, known as the Investigatory Powers Bill, which will (amongst other things) give the government legal power to collect, analyse and retain in a gigantic database for 12 months everyone’s electronic communications interactions (phone, email, web history, text and WhatsApp messages, etc) regardless of whether you are suspected of committing a crime.
The surveillance debate – even boring by C-SPAN standards?
Bulk data collection or bulk waste collection. Remind me what’s the difference again? Photo by colleen_elizabeth
Cleverly, the government has managed to couch the surveillance debate in language that is, to quote Jon Oliver, “even boring by C-Spann standards”. Talk of bulk data collection is more likely to evoke a service your local council might offer to help you get rid of an old mattress than a scene from The Lives of Others. And even if you can get your head around the opaque language being used, most of the attention in the debate focuses on the (rightly) emotive issues of terrorism and serious crime, leaving little time to consider the effect mass surveillance has on innocent citizens and the health of our democratic society.
In the interests of balancing out the surveillance debate , I’d like to borrow liberally from Jim’s talk to share with you 3 reasons why you should be worried about the government’s plans, especially if you think the Investigatory Powers Bill won’t affect you.
1. Mass surveillance undermines democratic accountability
Aerial photograph of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in Cheltenham, Gloucestershire. Are MPs in a position to hold GCHQ to account if they didn’t even know their communications were being eavesdropped? Photographer: GCHQ/Crown Copyright
Last week, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal announced these assurances had been:
“a political statement in a political context, encompassing the ambiguity that is sometimes to be found in political statements”
Furthermore, even if the statements of protection had been given in good faith, it is not technically possible to offer these assurances in an era of bulk data collection of the entire population’s electronic communications.
The tribunal’s ruling has, predictably, led to much soul searching by politicians of all stripes, with Labour’s Chris Bryant even managing to secure an emergency debate on the issue on Monday.
For me, the confusion caused by the ruling reveals the extent to which the surveillance agenda has managed to circumvent conventional democratic accountability.
Essentially, all of us, including the vast majority of elected politicians, are told to trust the authorities who tell us mass surveillance is necessary to protect national security and not to ask too many questions.
In this culture of secrecy, asking questions is deemed to be undermining the effectiveness of the authorities’ work and giving tacit cover or support for terrorists. Consequently, it becomes impossible to have an open, democratic debate about how we best go about balancing the security needs of our country with respect for our human rights.
We should be extremely wary of allowing the Investigatory Powers Bill to pass without having an open and democratic debate about the kind of country we want to live in and where the balance lies between the powers of the state and the rights of individual citizens.
2. The Investigatory Powers Bill will undermine the free press and civil society
3 police officers guarding Downing Street. Should the police have used surveillance legislation intended for anti-terrorism work to investigate the Plebgate scandal? Photo: Egghead06
While you may feel you don’t have much to worry about in terms of the authorities accessing your records, there are and will always be people who do need privacy protection.
Journalists need privacy protection. Imagine, for example, you are a journalist and you have received a tip off about Police wrongdoing. Would you be brave enough to investigate the allegation if you thought your communications could be accessed by the very same organisation?
Whatever you think of The Sun and Rupert Murdoch’s News International operations, I hope you’ll agree that it’s not right that the UK’s surveillance legislation can be used to hamper the media. If that is what is possible under today’s legislation, we should think carefully before expanding the amount of data authorities can gather on all of us.
Even if you think that journalists by virtue of the job they do are fair game for the authorities, their sources still need to be protected. The Investigatory Powers Bill, by expanding data collection and giving the police and other authorities more rights of access, will make normal, everyday people more reluctant to come forward and report wrongdoing.
3. Mass surveillance is a golden opportunity for criminals
Will increased personal data collection and weakened encryption create more opportunities for criminals? Photo: Perspecsys Photos
Even if you are personally comfortable with the idea of the government passing more surveillance legislation without proper democratic debate and don’t care all that much about the rights of journalists and whistleblowers, chances are you wouldn’t be too keen about criminals getting hold of your personal information.
As well as increasing the total amount of personal information for criminals to target, government efforts to weaken encryption will make it easier for criminals to break into that data. While the government may wish to believe it can demand a special key or ‘backdoor’ to unlock encrypted that only it can use, the reality is criminals will discover this vulnerability and, in so doing, undermine the encryption that not only protects our privacy but is essential for online banking and secure e-commerce payments.
Francis Clarke 
